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WHEN FREE SPEECH AND
FREE ELECTIONS COLLIDE:
A NORTH CAROLINA CASE STUDY
ROBERT H. HALL*

I. INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment boldly declares, "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech"' - but what
happens when other rights are trampled by a literal reading of that
command? We readily accept that the government's compelling
interest in protecting public health and safety justifies many
common-sense limitations on speech. It is illegal, for example, to
yell "Fire" in a crowded movie theater or send a letter to your
2
In politics, as well, an
neighbor laced with anthrax powder.
absolute prohibition against any regulation of speech would cripple
state and federal constitutional protections of free and fair
elections.' It is illegal, for example, to give a speech about your
favorite candidate inside a polling place or send money to voters
with your list of endorsements.4
* Bob Hall has investigated the flow of political money in North
Carolina for 20 years and written dozens of reports as research director for the
Institute for Southern Studies, Democracy South, and, since 2003, Democracy
He was
North Carolina (http://www.democracy-nc.org/moneyresearch/).
named a MacArthur Fellow in 1992 and serves on the board of N.C. Voters
for Clean Elections. He wishes to thank Carmen Hoyme for her valuable help
in researching and preparing numerous footnotes for this article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend I.
2. Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
3. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) ("[T]here must be a
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest.").
4. See generally Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (holding that a
state statute prohibiting solicitation of votes within one hundred feet of a
polling place was a valid content-based restriction on protected speech);
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982) (indicating that state prohibition on
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Where should the line be drawn in balancing the rights of
free speech with the right to a free and fair election? Someone
could argue, at least in theory, that sending money to voters is a
form of protected free speech, but it is more plainly a transfer of
property, with at least an implicit expectation of something in
return. And that's why it is illegal. Section 163-275(2) of the
General Statutes of North Carolina says, "It shall be unlawful...
for any person to give or promise or request or accept at any
time.., any money, property or other thing of value whatsoever in
return for the vote of any elector."' Someone else could argue, at
least in theory, that similar reasoning should apply to campaign
donations: Money given to a politician, as to a voter, creates an
economic relationship that taints the integrity of a free and fair
election. Put another way, a donation is an investment or a
property transfer that carries an expectation of reciprocal action,
and as North Carolina's six-term State Treasurer Harlan E. Boyles
cautioned, "a lot of contributors want some return in benefits."6
Before he died in 2003, the conservative Boyles translated his
growing concern about "pay-to-play" politics into a rather radical
suggestion: He asked policymakers to adopt a rule that would ban
campaign donors who give over $250 to a state-level politician from
being able to do business with any State agency for two years. His
idea went nowhere.7
exchanging anything of value for votes served a compelling government
interest in avoiding corrupt elections).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-275(2) (2003).
6. Bob Hall, Phipps Convictions Are Just the Start, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 23, 2003, at A23; see also Democracy N.C., The Color of
Money

in

Charlotte:

July

2002,

at

http://www.democracy-

nc.org/moneyresearch/2002/colormoneyinchltjuly.html (last visited Jan. 26,
2005) ("[A]s former state Treasurer Harlan Boyles has noted, too many of
these donors 'expect a return in benefits' on their political investment.") (on
file with the First Amendment Law Review).
7. Boyles shared his idea for a ban with key legislators and included it in
a memo to Gary Bartlett, Executive Director of the State Board of Elections,
dated February 1, 2000. No bill was introduced that incorporated his idea. A
less ambitious provision was defeated in a 1998 bill to restructure the state
Board of Transportation (House Bill 1304). It said persons giving more than
$500 per year to the governor could not serve as members of the state's Board
of Transportation, but legislators deleted this provision before passing the bill.

2004]

175

FREE SPEECHAND FREE ELECTIONS

Obviously, a total ban on campaign donations is far more
problematic in theory and in practice than a ban on giving cash to
voters. Politicians need money to get their message out and to
engage in effective speech, but voters do not need money to choose
which candidate to support. It would be interesting to trace the
history of justifications used for allowing private campaign
donations, even donations from corporate non-citizens in some
situations. I suspect the practical need for money in the system
strongly influenced the reasoning that legitimized private
contributions and eventually elevated them to an expression of the
donor's free speech. Part II of this article briefly reviews the legal
framework under which problems of campaign finance and free
speech are analyzed. Part III provides a number of examples of
campaign practices in North Carolina to demonstrate that political
corruption is not a hypothetical or harmless problem in the state. It
also describes features of the state's campaign finance regulations
that protect First Amendment rights while making the flow of
money more transparent and the purchasing-power advantages of
wealthy donors less corrosive. Part IV discusses the advantages of
offering public financing for elections, in contrast to "command and
control" regulations. This article concludes that it is crucial for
policymakers, citizens, watchdog groups, and legal experts to insist
that laws to protect free and fair elections be strengthened and not
subverted in the name of protecting free speech.8
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

In its landmark 1976 decision, Buckley v. Valeo,9 the U.S.
Supreme Court laid out the consequences of treating campaign
contributions as political "speech." In Buckley and its progeny, the

See Jena Heath, House Passes DOT Revamp,
N.C.), July 9, 1998, at A3.

NEWS

&

OBSERVER

(Raleigh,

8. An excellent resource for preparing appropriate and constitutionally
defensible legislation is: BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WRITING REFORM: A
GUIDE TO

(Deborah

DRAFTING

Goldberg

STATE AND

ed.,

2004
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Revised

FINANCE LAWS,

Ed.),

http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/prog-htmanual.html.
9. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

available

at
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Court clarified that the government's interest in regulating
campaign money is limited to preventing "actual corruption or the
appearance of corruption,"10 where corruption is understood as
quid pro quo transactions akin to bribery or extortion.1 Going
beyond this standard infringes on the donor's right to selfexpression or the candidate's right to speak effectively to the
public. 12 First Amendment absolutists contend that the fuzzy
"preventing the appearance of corruption" standard imposes too
heavy a burden on the rights of those with money to spend in

elections. 3 Others argue that corruption should not only include

10. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 94-95 (2003); FEC v. Mass. Citizens
for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,269 (1986); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
11. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 ("To the extent that large contributions
are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office
holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is
undermined.").
12. Id. at 28. The Buckley Court upheld the challenged limitation on
political contributions because the law
focuse[d] precisely on... the narrow aspect of political
association where the actuality and potential for
corruption have been identified while leaving persons free
to engage in independent political expression, to associate
actively through volunteering their services, and to assist
to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in
supporting candidates and committees with financial
resources.
Id.
13. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, McConnell v. FEC: Not Senator Buckley's
First Amendment, 3 ELECTION L.J. 127, 130 (2004) ("[F]or the Court to insist
that corruption be defined narrowly.., is for it to erect and maintain a
substantial First Amendment barrier to campaign finance regulation.
Conversely, for the Court to permit the legislature to adopt or embrace a
broader definition is to lower the barrier, perhaps to the point of dismantling
it entirely."); James L. Gibson, BCRA's Assault on the First Amendment: The
Death of the Overbreadth Doctrine, 3 ELECtMON L.J. 245, 246 (2004) (arguing
that a "majority on the Court ignored the empirical evidence on the
overbreadth of BCRA... and that as a consequence, the concept of overbreadth has been rendered virtually useless as an empirical construct"); Cecil
C. Kuhne, III, Restricting Political Campaign Speech: The Uneasy Legacy of
McConnell v. FEC,32 CAP. U. L. REV. 839, 842 (2004) ("What many may find
disturbing in the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence.., is the notion that
largely unproven legislative efforts to prevent vaguely defined concepts of
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actual and apparent quid pro quo abuse, but also other actions that
threaten the integrity of the election system and cause14citizens to
believe voting is useless or election outcomes are rigged.
Given these competing views, how should policymakers in a
state like North Carolina develop a set of campaign finance
regulations that balance the right to free speech with the right to a
free and fair election? There is no question that lawmakers must
give proper deference to the First Amendment, including subjecting
many proposals to a "strict scrutiny" test. 5 On the other hand, it is
'corruption' or the 'appearance of corruption' are in fact sufficient to justify
wholesale infringement of important First Amendment rights.").
14. See, e.g., LARRY L. BERG, HARLAN HAHN & JOHN R.
SCHMIDHAUSER,

CORRUPTION IN THE AMERICAN

POLITICAL SYSTEM

3, 7

(1976) (asserting that the meaning of corruption in the election context must
include not only "quid pro quo" abuses, but also conduct that "violates and
undermines the norms of the system of public order which is deemed
indispensable for the maintenance of political democracy"); Spencer Overton,
Restraintand Responsibility: JudicialReview of Campaign Reform, 61 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 663, 678 (2004) ("It is practically impossible for legislatures to
provide clearly defined exceptions in the text of a statute for all of the varied
activities that are less likely to corrupt, or appear to corrupt, the process. [No]
bright-line rule .. . capture[s] all activity that implicates the state's interest.").
The Supreme Court's frequent linkage in recent decisions between preventing
corruption and protecting "the integrity of the election process" points to the
relevance of demonstrating a link between problematic practices and a loss of
public trust in electoral politics (via polling, academic research, media reports
and commentary, public protests, voter nonparticipation, etc.). See, e.g.,
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136 (2003) ("Our treatment of contribution restrictions
reflects more than the limited burdens they impose on First Amendment
freedoms. It also reflects the importance of the interests that underlie
contribution limits -interests in preventing 'both the actual corruption
threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public
confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption.').
Corruption is not limited to what happens between money suppliers and
recipients; most dangerous is corruption of the election process itself, the
distortion of fair elections and dissolution of a system of self-government.
15. Whenever a "fundamental right" such as the right to free expression
is potentially infringed by government action, courts will assess the
constitutionality of the law using "strict scrutiny," which requires that the law
in question be "narrowly tailored" to further a "compelling" government
interest. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (stating that
the law would be constitutional only if "justified by a compelling government
interest" and "'necessary... to the accomplishment' of that legitimate
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absolutely crucial for policymakers to examine closely the actual
characteristics of campaign behavior in their jurisdiction rather than
become trapped in a thicket of legal theory. For example, an
advocate for unfettered speech by "independent expenditure"
committees can logically argue that they should not be subjected to
burdensome disclosure or contribution limits because they have
little chance of corrupting a candidate." After all, as a matter of
definition, they are "independent" and "not coordinated" with the
candidate or the candidate's opponent and therefore provide no
nexus for actual or apparent corruption. However, on closer
examination of real world situations, it turns out that sponsors of
these committees and their donors are often in communication with
political leaders who greatly influence the strategy of candidates
targeted by the committee.17 Therefore, policymakers have a
interest") (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) and Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)
(internal citations omitted) ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved,
the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by
a 'compelling state interest,' and that legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."). Commentators
have suggested however, that in cases involving campaign finance and speech
rights, the Court appears to apply a somewhat less rigorous standard to
determine the constitutionality of campaign reform laws. See, e.g., Richard L.
Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance
Incoherence of McConnell v. FederalElection Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
31, 42-43 (2004) (noting that in campaign finance cases, "the Court ratcheted

down the level of scrutiny ...to one in which interests need only be
"sufficiently important" and not narrowly tailored to the government's
interest").
16. An "independent" or "nonconnected" committee is a "political
committee that is not a party committee, an authorized committee of a
candidate or a separate segregated fund established by a corporation or labor
organization ....[They] are commonly called 'political action committees' or
PACs.... ."

FED.

ELECTION

COMM'N,

CAMPAIGN

GUIDE

FOR

at
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nongui.pdf.
17. The FEC itself announced that even "leadership PACs," which are
created by political leaders "to support candidates for various.., offices" and
are "associated with a candidate for federal office[,] ... nonetheless may
remain legally unaffiliated with the candidate's principal campaign committee
and operate under the same rules as other nonconnected committees." Id.
(citing the following FEC Advisory Opinions: AO 2000-12, AO 1991-12, AO

NONCONNECTED

COMMITTEES

3

(2002),

available
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legitimate interest in regulating so-called independent committees
in a manner that is consistent with regulation of committees that
Such regulation appropriately
donate directly to candidates.
reflects the realities of campaign behavior and the government's
interest in protecting a fair election.
Crafting statutes suited to practical reality as well as legal
theory is not only a good idea, it is the lawmakers' duty and
obligation. In fact, two recent landmark decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the field of campaign-finance regulation, Nixon

v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC 18 and McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission, 9 emphasize the importance of policymakers
looking at real world conditions and fashioning a balance of rights
that addresses those conditions. For a generation, courts have
distinguished "express advocacy" for or against the election of a
candidate, which is subject to regulation, from "issue advocacy,"
1986-06, AO 1985-40 and AO 1978-12). A decision by the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina illustrates how a preoccupation with
definitions can obscure real dangers. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 108 F.
Supp. 2d 498 (E.D.N.C. 2000). The district court judge invalidated a North
Carolina statute that limited contributions to independent expenditure
committees (IECs), but only after defining away the State's "strongest
evidence" of "corruptive" behavior by a committee. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v.
Leake, No. 5:99-CV-798-BO(3) at 19-20 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2001) (order
granting Plaintiff's motion to dismiss) (on file with the First Amendment Law
Review). According to the district court, the "strongest evidence" of
potentially corruptive behavior was the claim that a group of hog farmers
called Farmers for Fairness had "'threatened the legislative leadership that it
would run advertisements' in 'retaliation for votes against the hog
industry....'" Id. (rejecting the State's argument that corruption is
encouraged by permitting unlimited contributions to independent expenditure
committees, which "threaten legislative leadership" with the possibility of
retaliatory negative campaign ads). In an earlier case involving Farmers for
Fairness, the Fourth Circuit had held that the group did not engage in express
advocacy "in explicit words" and therefore did not meet the definition of an
IEC. Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155, 158-59 (4th Cir. 2000). The district court
judge in Leake cited Perry as the source of his conclusion that: "[T]he Fourth
Circuit held that the actions of Farmers for Fairness were not 'corruptive,' but,
rather, constituted protected speech under the First Amendment." Leake, No.
5:99-CV-798-BO(3) at 20 (citing Perry, 231 F.3d 155). Presto, the evidence of
corruptive behavior disappeared.
18. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
19. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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which does not directly urge the election or defeat of a specific
candidate and is therefore exempt from regulation. Many courts
(especially those in the Fourth Circuit) have distinguished these
two categories using a simple test of whether or not the
advertisement in question contained any of the so-called "magic
words" identified in Buckley. 2° The overall message and context
did not matter in these cases; legal doctrine maintained an
advertisement could never be "express advocacy" unless it used
certain words. In the 2003 McConnell decision, the Supreme Court
firmly dismissed this simple-minded standard and upheld the right
of Congress to respond to real world campaign practices by
designing reasonable regulations of paid speech that is
electioneering even though it lacks "magic words.",2 ' The Court
noted that although "the distinction between 'issue' and express
advocacy seemed neat in theory, the two categories of
advertisements proved functionally identical in important respects.
Both were used to advocate the election or defeat of clearly
identified federal candidates, even though the so-called issue ads
eschewed the use of 'magic words.' ' 22 In the same decision, the
Court upheld new regulations imposed on "soft money" fundraising
practices and "soft money" committees because lawmakers had

20. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 344 F.3d 418, 425 (4th Cir.
2003) (rejecting, among other provisions, N.C. Gen Stat. § 163-278.14A(a)(2)
for violating the "magic words" test for express advocacy); Va. Soc'y for
Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 392 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that
"express advocacy" only occurred with the use of certain specific words such
as "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your ballot for," "vote against,"
"defeat," and "reject"); Perry, 231 F.3d at 161 (vigorously rejecting the State's
argument that if "the purpose of the advertisement is to defeat a particular
candidate, regulation ... is constitutional.., even if the advertisement itself
does not contain words of express advocacy"); FEC v. Christian Action
Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1052-55 (4th Cir. 1997) (CAN II) (outlining
Court of Appeals cases involving "a string of losses in cases between the FEC
and issue advocacy groups over the meaning of the phrase 'express
advocacy"').
21. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 192-93 (The "class of magic words were born
of an effort to avoid constitutional infirmities [of the statute at issue in
Buckley]. [T]hey in no way drew a constitutional boundary that forever fixed
the permissible scope of provisions regulating campaign-related speech.").
22. Id. at 126.
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every right to respond to the overwhelming evidence that such
practices and entities damaged the integrity of the election process;
by definition, "soft money" may not go to the election committee of
a federal candidate, but in reality its solicitation and spending had
become a nexus for exactly the kind of corruption that government
regulation was meant to stop.23
III. FREE SPEECH AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA-

A CASE STUDY

What are the real world conditions in North Carolina
politics that policymakers must address as they balance rights and
responsibilities? North Carolina enjoys a reputation for "good
government," but there is mounting evidence that the increased
pressure to raise campaign money in a competitive political climate
is inflating the importance of private donors and pushing various
players to the line between legal and illegal activity, if not over it.
A. Penaltiesfor Illegal Contributions
In 1996, A. Stephen Pierce, then the owner of the largest
rest-home chain in North Carolina, violated the state's $4,000-perelection contribution limit by funneling at least $101,000 through
various associates and family members to four state-level officials
running for re-election. 24 Pierce delivered the illegal money to his
chosen candidates in the form of cashier checks with the names of
"straw donors" in the memo line. According to financial records
obtained by the State Bureau of Investigation, Pierce wrote checks

23. Id. at 127 ("The solicitation, transfer, and use of soft money thus
enabled parties and candidates to circumvent FECA's limitations on the
source and amount of contributions in connection with federal elections.").
24. Bob Geary, Inside or Out; The Democratic Race for Lieutenant
Governor Offers a Choice Between Youth and Experience, INDEP. WKLY

(Durham, N.C.), Mar. 29, 2000, at 14; Christopher Quinn & David Rice, SBI
Lodges Charges Against Rest-Home Owner, WINSTON-SALEM J., Mar. 7, 1998,

at Al [hereinafter SBI Lodges Charges]; David Rice & Christopher Quinn,
DA Asks 4 to Forfeit Contributions, WINSTON-SALEM J., May 7, 1999, at Al

[hereinafter Contributions].
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on several occasions to his bank for up to $40,000, received a series
of cashier checks for $4,000 or less, and made it look as if each
cashier check originated from a different individual. 2' No evidence
indicated any of the candidates knew they were accepting illegal
26
contributions.
Democracy South became suspicious of the
donations because several were listed on the candidates' disclosure
reports with phony addresses for the donors.
Following a
complaint by Democracy South and a lengthy investigation, Pierce
$6,000.27
was convicted on misdemeanor charges in 1999 and fined
The four elected officials turned over the $101,000 in illegal
donations to the state, but kept at least $54,000 in other
contributions from various Pierce-related donors.28
Steve Pierce ranked among the state's most prolific political
fundraisers and contributors for many years before the
investigation. He and his family and employees gave well over
$250,000 to North Carolina candidates and political committees
from 1991 through 1996. 29 He founded the rest-home industry's

25. N.C. State Bureau of Investigation, Analysis of 1996 and 1997
Campaign Reports for Contributions Related to A. Stephen Pierce, Case No.

1998-00031 (1998) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review); see also
Chris Fitzsimon, CampaignFinance Reform Overdue, TRIANGLE Bus. J., Apr.
10, 1998, at 51 ("The charges are that Steve Pierce used money from his
business to reimburse several people who made large contributions to the
campaign
treasury
of
Sen.
Beverly
Perdue."),
available at
http://triangle.bizjournals.com/triangle/stories/1998/04/13/editorial3.html; Rice
& Quinn, supra note 24 (reporting that District Attorney Tom Keith wanted
four prominent state politicians to give up $101,000 in illegal campaign
contributions made by A. Stephen Pierce).
26. SBI Lodges Charges,supra note 24; Contributions,supra note 24.
27. Democracy South, Democracy South Calls for Investigation of
Possible Money Laundering of Corporate Campaign Contributions, at
http://www.democracync.org/moneyresearch/1997/corpcampmoneylaund.html (June 2, 1997); Martin
Kady, Two Broke Donations Law, WINSTON-SALEM J., Oct. 22, 1999, at Al;
John Wagner, Former Owner of Rest Home Fined $6,000 for Donation, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 22, 1999, at A3.
28. Press Release, Democracy South, New Evidence of Steve Pierce
Bundling Involves $200,000 to Hunt, Wicker and Key Republicans (Mar. 9,
1998),
available
at
http://www.democracync.org/moneyresearch/1998/newevidence.html.
29. David Rice & Christopher Quinn, Industry's Reach Well-Known,
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political action committee and is credited with increasing the
industry's clout with the state officials who regulate the industry
and set the rate of public-assistance payments for its large number
of low-income residents. 30 From 1991 through 1996, industryrelated donors gave $1.6 million to state candidates and political
committees, and the volume of tax dollars going to adult-care
homes soared by $530 million per year; meanwhile, advocates for
the elderly were unable to get lawmakers to increase the minimum
staffing requirements in those homes.3 ' In 1998, the Senate
Appropriations Committee, then co-chaired by a major recipient of
Mr. Pierce's contributions, gave the industry another rate hike in a
last-minute
"budget mystery," while ignoring a bill to increase
2
staffing.

The Pierce case highlighted several practical problems with
North Carolina's campaign finance regulations. First, state law
made it illegal for a candidate to knowingly accept a donation
"made in the name of another" person, but did not penalize the
donor.33 That flaw was corrected through a 1999 amendment to
Mar. 10, 1998, at Al.
30. Id. See Eric Bates, Grey Gold: Mining the Golden Years, INDEP.
WKLY (Durham, N.C.), Apr. 30 to May 16, 1997 (three part series discussing
political contributions and the rest-home industry's clout); Karen Garloch,
Report Blasts Rest Home Profit Margins, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 1,
1997, at C2; John Hechinger, Getting Rich on Rest Homes?, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, May 7, 1995, at Al; Phoebe Zerwick & Christopher Ryan, Homes'
Patients Suffer, Critics Say, WINSTON-SALEM J., Mar. 26, 1995, at Al.
31. Bates, supra note 30; Sue Sturgis, Grey Gold: Wages of Caring,
INDEP. WKLY (Durham, N.C.), May 7, 1997, at 12-13 (discussing chronically
low staffing requirements, unchanged in years: in rest homes, "one aide for
every 50 residents" during the night shift and, in nursing homes, enough
personnel "to provide 2.1 hours of staff time per patient per day").
32. Jena Heath, Rest Home Lobby Offers Clue to Budget Mystery, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 3, 1998, at Al; Prioritiesfor the Elderly,
Who Will Speak for Their Safety?, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 8, 1998, at
A10; Under the Dome: Perdue Gets Flak Over Funding, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 10, 1998, at A3.
33. The statute merely prohibited a "candidate, political committee,
referendum committee, political party or treasurer" from "knowingly
accept[ing] any contribution made... in the name of another person or made
anonymously." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.14(a) (1999) (emphasis added),
amended by Campaign Reform Act of 1999, sec. 4(a), § 163-278.14, 1999 N.C.
WINSTON-SALEM J.,
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Section 163-278.14 of the General Statutes of North Carolina,
which provided that "[n]o individual, political committee, or other
entity shall make any contribution anonymously.., or in the name
34
of another."
Violation of the provision is a Class Two
•
31

misdemeanor. Second, all criminal violations of campaign finance
laws had a statute of limitations that expired two years after the
violation occurred,36 but because campaign reports were often not
processed by the State Board of Elections for more than a year,
37

potential problems routinely went undetected. In the Pierce case,
the district attorney rushed to file the first charges against Pierce
just as the statute of limitations expired. Campaign reformers and
the Association of District Attorneys proposed making some

campaign abuses subject to felony prosecution, as well as
lengthening the statute of limitations on the misdemeanor
offenses. 38 Finally, in 2001, the statute of limitations was amended
to define the two years as running "from the day the last report is
due.., for the election cycle for which the violation occurred." '3 9
This change had the effect of extending the statute of limitations by
Sess. Laws 453.
34. Campaign Reform Act of 1999, sec. 4(a), § 163-278.14, 1999 N.C.
Sess. Laws 453.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.27(a) (2003). Prior to that change, the
district attorney who prosecuted Pierce could only charge him with violating
another statute that prohibits an individual from giving more than $4,000 to a
candidate in an election. Id. § 163-278.13.
36. Prior to amendment of the campaign finance laws, the applicable
statute of limitations was determined by the provision that requires "all
misdemeanors" to be "presented or found by the grand jury within two years
after the commission of the same." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-1 (2003).
37. Due to a lack of funding and staffing, the State Board of Elections
has frequently been unable to fulfill the statutory mandate for timely
processing of reports. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.24 (2003) ("Within four
months after the date of each election or referendum, the Executive Director
shall examine or cause to be examined each statement filed with the Board
under this Article, and, referring to the election or referendum, determine
whether the statement conforms to law and to the truth.").
38. See Jena Heath, Going Against Grain, DA Takes on 'Bundling' Case,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 15, 1998, at Bi; David Rice, Gift
Horse: Blind Eye Turned on Handouts, WINSTON-SALEM J., Oct. 22, 1999, at
Al; Contributions,supra note 24.
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.27(a) (2003).
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about a year and making prosecution more possible.
A third change in North Carolina law that flowed from the
Pierce case involved the introduction of steep civil fines for illegal
campaign contributions. A new provision adopted in 2001 gave the
State Board of Elections the means to pursue violators through civil
proceedings, rather than waiting for a local district attorney to
charges. 40
become interested enough to file criminal misdemeanor
If the new law had been in place when Pierce gave $101,000
illegally, he could have faced a civil fine of three times that amount
or $303,000 - a substantial increase from the $6,000 criminal fine for
his misdemeanors. A companion to the new provision gave the
Board authority to require the violator "to cease and desist" further
activity and authority "to take any remedial action deemed
Nevertheless, the persistence of illegal donations
appropriate. 4
suggests that those responsible for enforcing North Carolina
campaign laws should have investigative and prosecutorial powers
to charge egregious violators with even stiffer penalties, including
felonies with possible prison time.
A complaint filed by Democracy North Carolina with the
State Board of Elections in June 2004 illustrates the need for
tougher enforcement. Extensive research into contributions from
donors related to the video-poker industry led us to conclude that
"an industry described as 'the crack cocaine of gambling' aims to
use its illegal profits to gain political protection" by plying
By state law,
politicians with sizeable (but illegal) contributions.
large video consoles with various card games are allowed to
entertain and pay off winners at the corner store or bar with no
more than $10 worth of merchandise per day, 43 but the machines

40. Id. § 163-278.34(b).
41. Id. § 163-278.34(c).
42. Complaint by Bob Hall, Research Director, Democracy N.C., to the
N.C. State Bd. of Elections (Jun. 29, 2002), availableat http://www.democracySee
nc.org/moneyresearch/2004/VideoPokerComplainJune2002revised.pdf.
also David Plotz, Flushed: Why South Carolina Killed Its Gambling Industry,
SLATE MAG., at http://slate.msn.com/id/36673 (Oct. 15, 1999) ("[v]ideo poker,
which is fast and requires skill, is known as "video crack because it is by far the
most addictive form of gambling").
43. N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 14-306(b) (2003).
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have become electronic bandits in backroom gambling syndicates
that offer cash prizes and take in more than $100 million a year in
North Carolina. 44 Federal and state law enforcement officials have

pushed for a complete ban of the machines, especially after
thousands more arrived from South Carolina in 2000, when that
state's supreme court ruled the games illegal. 45 The State Senate in
North Carolina has repeatedly passed bills to outlaw the games, but

each bill dies in the State House because of well-publicized
opposition from Speaker Jim Black (D-Mecklenburg County).46 In

the 2002 election, donors tied to the video-poker industry
44. The $100 million figure is considered very conservative by law
enforcement officials. It is based on the industry's declared revenues of $26.9
million in the first quarter of 2001, reported in: N.C. DEPT. OF REVENUE, TAX
RESEARCH Div., VIDEO GAMING REPORT, 2001: FIRST QUARTER ACTIVITY
(2001) (compiling information reported to the Department of Revenue by
video poker machine owners in a report submitted quarterly to the Joint
Legislative Commission on Governmental Operations) (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review). See also Karen Cimino, Sheriffs Are Angry About

Video Poker, CHARLOTTE

OBSERVER,

Aug. 19, 2001, at Al (reporting that the

industry's revenues for the first quarter were more than $26 million, and
during that three month period, $4.5 million was spent on the machines in just
three counties).
45. See Joytime Dist. & Amusement Co. v. South Carolina, 528 S.E.2d
647, 657 (S.C. 1999) (upholding legislative ban on video gaming as
constitutional). See also Wade Rollins, Legislation Aims to Block Invasion of
Video Poker from S.C., NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 21, 2000, at
A3. Law enforcement officials have clearly stated their opposition to video
poker: "It is the position of the North Carolina Sheriff's Association ... that
video gaming machines should be completely outlawed in North Carolina."
N.C. SHERIFFS Ass'N, REPORT TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, VIDEO GAMING MACHINES: COST OF
available
at
2
(2001),
&
ENFORCEMENT
REGISTRATION

http://www.ncsheriffs.org/legislative/Video.Gaming.Machines.pdf.
46. See Jack Betts, Place Your Bets on Investigation of Video Poker,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 26, 2004, at P1; Sharif Durhams, Poker Probe
Nets Donor, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Sept. 23, 2004, at Al; Big Jackpot: Why
Is Jim Black Protecting Video Poker?, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, Dec. 23,
2003, at A6; Black Leads in Video Poker Donations, FAYETTEVILLE
OBSERVER, Dec. 22, 2003, at B3; Is Black Honest? Place Your Bets,
WILMINGTON STAR-NEWS, Dec. 23, 2003, at E6; Associated Press, Video
Machines,
Pulls
Out
Owner
Poker
(Dec.
http://www.newsl4charlotte.com/shared/print/default.asp?ArD=82458
27, 2004).
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contributed more than $120,000 to Black, twice what he got from
the industry's donors in the 2000 cycle and far more than any other
The Democracy North
legislative candidate, ever received.
Carolina complaint documented how a significant number of the
contributions "came from donors who say they were unaware that a
relative or friend in the video-poker business apparently made a
political donation in their name... [or] came from donors who
admit they were paid or reimbursed for making a political donation
to help an associate in the video-poker industry., 47 At the time of
this writing, the State Board of Elections and U.S. Attorney's office
are investigating what the complaint calls "a pattern of political
corruption [that] permeates the industry, from officials in key
positions of its trade association to 'mom-and-pop' distributors to
owners of the corner store that profit from the industry's illegal
gambling operations. 4 ' Democracy North Carolina's research
indicates that the industry's leaders have long viewed collecting and
giving political contributions as integral to getting things they want
from government. As long as the heaviest punishment is a fine and
misdemeanor penalty, too many wealthy special interests like the
video poker industry will choose to violate campaign finance laws
rather than lose the access and influence the illegal contributions
seem to produce. The video-poker complaint has fortunately
attracted the interest of federal officials who have the flexibility to
introduce felony charges and the tools of a grand jury investigation.
But as a complaint before state officials, it faces the familiar
problems of a short statute of limitations, meager investigative
resources, and relatively weak penalties. North Carolina has made
47. Complaint by Bob Hall, supra note 42 (asking the State Board of
Elections to use its statutory authority to investigate certain campaign
contributions related to the video-poker industry).
48. Id. A pattern of political corruption associated with the video poker
industry was apparent in South Carolina before the games were prohibited.
After Republican Governor David Beasely unsuccessfully attempted to ban
video poker, the industry contributed at least $3 million to defeat his
reelection. The video poker industry is estimated to have contributed nearly
seventy percent of the Democratic gubernatorial candidate's "war chest," and
he ultimately won the election. The chairman of the South Carolina
Democratic Party at that time was also the leading attorney for the video
poker industry. Plotz, supra note 42.
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progress in each of these areas, but has plenty of room for
improvement. Neither free speech nor fair elections can be
protected by an under-funded campaign enforcement agency or by
a set of laws that lack real teeth.
B. ElectioneeringVersus Issue Advocacy

In April 1998, a political consultant for a group of major
North Carolina hog producers told the State Board of Elections
that his client, Farmers for Fairness, was spending approximately
$10,000 a week on advertisements against state Rep. Cindy Watson
(R-Duplin County) because she had helped lead an effort to
increase regulation of the hog industry. 49 The wording in the
advertising was shaped by responses to a telephone poll asking
voters in Watson's district, "Would you be more likely or less likely
to vote for Cindy Watson if you knew [a variety of characteristics
about Watson]? ' 50 Farmers for Fairness, whose membership
remained anonymous, said it did not need to file campaign
disclosure reports because it was engaging in protected "issue
advocacy" and its activities were therefore outside the jurisdiction
of the State Board of Elections. An attorney for the group later
admitted to a federal judge that its advertising was designed to help
defeat Watson's bid for reelection, but he contended that since the
ads lacked the "magic words" of express advocacy, they were
genuine issue ads and not subject to regulation.5 Rep. Watson

49. In Re: Complaint of Rep. Cynthia B. Watson & Steven Rader about
Farmers For Fairness, Inc. 7-8 (N.C. State Bd. of Elections, June 23, 1998)
(unpublished agency order) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review)
[hereinafter Farmers for Fairness Order]. See also Jena Heath, 10 District
Race Divides Hog Country, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 2, 1998,
at Al (reporting on the embittered Republican primary race for the N.C.
House of Representatives in which Rep. Watson was targeted for defeat by
the hog industry).
50. Farmers for Fairness Order, supra note 49, at 6-7.
51. In a July 1998 hearing on Farmers For Fairness' appeal of the State
Board of Election's ruling that it was a political committee subject to
regulation, U.S. District Court Judge W. Earl Britt addressed Farmers For
Fairness attorney James Bopp: "You just admitted that your purpose was to
defeat [Watson] .... But your contention is that as long as you don't use those
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narrowly lost the primary election in May 1998 by a vote count of
787 to 768. Two of the three other legislators (all Republicans)
targeted by Farmers for Fairness were defeated in the general
election. As a result, the Democrats regained the majority in the
State House, and the Republican leaders then feuding with the hog
industry lost their power.
Data obtained from broadcast stations and Farmers for
Fairness show it spent $2.6 million for advertising in the twelve
months ending May 31, 1998. In just four months - from February
through May 1998 - it spent more than $100,000 for ads broadcast
on one New Bern television station, which covers Rep. Watson's
legislative district. In fact, the large outlays of money by Farmers
for Fairness during the 1998 primary exceeded all spending by
either of the state's major political parties in that period. Many of
the print and broadcast ads did not name specific candidates, but a
great many did. The muscular spending and success of Farmers for
Fairness brought home to North Carolina the real problem of the
election process being completely overwhelmed by a secretive,
unregulated, wealthy special interest group. The identity of
Farmers for Fairness' backers ultimately emerged: About a dozen
hog industry multi-millionaires set up and financed the group as a
nonprofit trade association with "dues" from their corporations that
they wrote off as tax-deductible expenses. 5 ' The association's
accountant explained that the tax benefits meant the companies
could purchase one million dollars worth of attack ads at a net cost
to its members of about $650,000. 3 Could there be a clearer

words, you can't be regulated?" "That's correct," Bopp answered. Steve Ford,
Hog Farmers' Money and the 'Magic Words,' NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), July 12, 1998, at A24.
52. Kristen B. Mitchell, IRS Probe Sought on Hog Barons, WILMINGTON

Aug. 4, 1998, at Bi; see also Press Release, N.C. Alliance for
Democracy, Millions Spent By Farmers For Fairness Prompts Call For "Issue
MORNING STAR,

Ad"

Regulation

(Feb. 25,

1999)

available at http://www.democracy-

nc.org/moneyresearch/1999/millionsspentbyfff.html.
53. Interview with A.E. Strange, Jr., Accountant, Williams, Overman,
Pierce, in Raleigh, N.C. (Fall 1998); see also Steve Ford, This Flood is Green And You Can Spend It, NEWS &

OBSERVER

(Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 7, 1999, at

A24 ("[M]embers [of Farmers for Fairness] were allowed to take tax
deductions on a large part of what they contributed. This tax accounting had
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perversion of the First Amendment's protection of robust debate?
Simply because they steered clear of a few key words, this handful
of wealthy businessmen were able to engage in electioneering,
escape regulation, gain a tax advantage, keep their identity secret,
and swamp a candidate whose own fundraising was tightly
regulated.
In reaction to the real-world threat that phony issue
advocacy groups posed to a fair election, the North Carolina
General Assembly passed a new statute in 1999 designed to
regulate electioneering communication, whether or not it used the
"magic words" described in the Buckley decision.5 4 That statute has
been challenged in a series of court cases that continue at this
writing. The new statute says that the financing of electioneering
communications should be regulated, and it defines such
communications as those that either (1) contain the "magic words"
or phrases of express advocacy or (2) "whose essential nature
expresses advocacy to the general public and goes beyond a mere
discussion of issues in that they direct voters to take some action to
nominate, elect, or defeat a candidate in an election., 55 The second
part of the definition also describes "contextual factors" that may
be examined if "the course of action is unclear., 56 Its construction
tracks language in the F.E.C. v. Furgatch57 and Massachusetts

the effect of giving the farmers a big discount on their ad purchases - a
discount subsidized by the public.").
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.14A (2003).
55. Id. § 163-278.14A(a).
56. Id. § 163-278.14A(a)(2).

57. 807 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that pre-election
newspaper advertisement that included various criticisms of President Carter
followed by the repeated refrain "don't let him do it," was express advocacy,
because there was "no doubt that the ad ask[ed] the public to vote against

Carter"), cert denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987). The Ninth Circuit proposed the
following standard for express advocacy:
[S]peech need not include any of the words listed in
Buckley to be express advocacy.., but it must, when read
as a whole, and with limited reference to external events,
be susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation but as
an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate.
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Citizens for Life58 decisions. However, because it goes beyond the
bright line test of whether or not "magic words" are present, Judge
Terrence W. Boyle of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
have repeatedly ruled
unconstitutional.5 9

the

second

part

of

the

definition

Without detailing the legal arguments, three points are
relevant to this discussion. First, legislators were clearly responding
to a proven danger to the integrity of the election process when
they passed Section 163-278.14A of the General Statutes of North
Carolina. 60 To take no action given that real danger would have
been irresponsible. Second, they attempted to balance protections
for free speech and free elections by giving specific standards and
focusing on the financing of the communications. Contrary to
propaganda from the National Rifle Association and other
opponents of regulating bogus issue advocacy, the statute did not
muzzle the free speech of anyone, nor did it prohibit any content
61
from being broadcast.
It simply said that any electioneering
58. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1986)
("The fact that [a] message is marginally less direct than 'Vote for Smith' does
not change its essential nature. The [newsletter at issue] goes beyond issue
discussion to express electoral advocacy. The disclaimer of endorsement
cannot negate this fact." Expression of this sort may be regulated when "it
represents express advocacy of the election of particular candidates
distributed to members of the general public."). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. §
163-278.14A (2003).
59. See Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F. 3d 155 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that N.C.
provision allowing regulation of issue advocacy when the speaker showed
"intent to advocate election or defeat of a candidate" was unconstitutionally
overbroad); Leake v. N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 108 F. Supp.2d 498 (E.D.N.C.
2000) (holding the express advocacy test that allows for consideration of
context, along with several other N.C. election law provisions, unconstitutional
and enjoining the State from enforcing those provisions), affd 344 F. 3d 418
(4th Cir. 2003), vacated by - U.S. -, 124 S. Ct. 2065 (2004) (mem.)
(remanding for reconsideration in light of the decision in McConnell).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. §163-278.14A (2003).
61. The National Rifle Association (NRA) activated its members against
federal regulation of bogus issue ads with scare tactics like this message on its
web site: "Campaign finance reform, especially under the guise of S.27 - the
McCain-Feingold legislation that passed the U.S. Senate in April - is a direct
attack on every individual American's First Amendment right to use political
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communication must be paid for with regulated money (from
regulated sources, in regulated amounts, with regulated disclosure),
just like communications sponsored by a candidate or political
party. Third, the wisdom of enacting this type of statute is finally
becoming evident, because the Supreme Court's McConnell v. FEC

decision specifically upholds the right of legislators
to regulate
62
electioneering activity that lacks the "magic words.
Because of the McConnell ruling, the lower courts are again
(as of early 2005) reviewing their decisions regarding the
constitutionality of Section 163-278.14A of the General Statutes of
63
North Carolina. The end result should inform policymakers how,
if at all, the statute should be rewritten, because North Carolina has
a continuing need for effective tools that address spurious issue

speech to protect the entire Bill of Rights."

The legislation "clearly is an

attack on the First Amendment," would "put the NRA out of business" and

"could mean prison terms for officials of organizations like the NRA and their
employees simply for attempting to exercise the group's collective First
Amendment rights." See JAMES 0. E. NORELL, NAT'L RIFLE Ass'N INST. FOR
LEGISLATIVE ACION, THE MCCAIN-FEINGOLD BILL: PUTTING A MUZZLE ON
THE
FIRST
AMENDMENT
(2001),
available
at
http://www.nraila.org/media/misc/muzzle.htm. NRA Executive Vice President
Wayne LaPierre issued the call to arms: "The NRA's 4 million members
should be proud to be a special interest group. Our special interest? Saving
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Now we are called
upon to save the First Amendment. That's our special interest as well." Id.
See also, Sharon Theimer, NRA Seeks Status as News Outlet, WASH. POST,
Dec. 7, 2003, at A9 (reporting that the NRA was "looking to buy a television
or radio station and declare that it should be treated as a news organization,
exempt from spending limits in the campaign finance law").
62. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 194 (2003). The McConnell Court
explained:
Nor are we persuaded, independent of our precedents,
that the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between
express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy. That
notion cannot be squared with our longstanding
recognition that the presence or absence of magic words
cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech
from a true issue ad.... Buckley's magic-words
requirement is functionally meaningless.
Id.

63. N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§163-278.14(A) (2003).
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advocacy. Fortunately, in light of McConnell, the State Board of
Elections has begun to more aggressively apply the first part of the
definition (where some sort of "magic words" are present) to
regulate the financing of ads that previously would be viewed as
unregulable (such as an ad promoting the candidacy of Patrick
Ballantine in 2004, sponsored by the national Republican
Governors Association).64 In addition, the General Assembly
adopted a new law to regulate electioneering in July 2004 that more
closely follows the time-limitations and other criteria in the federal
statute upheld in McConnell. That law also focuses on the
financing of ads that name a candidate, but it only applies to
communications in statewide and legislative races; 65 it should be
extended to cover activity in local and district elections.
C. CorporateIntervention in Elections

For more than seventy years, North Carolina policymakers
have taken steps to regulate the ways corporations can influence
elections. 66 Courts have long recognized the difference between
allowing a corporation to manage a PAC that is financed with the
personal contributions of its executives, and letting a corporation
use the money it amasses in the economic marketplace to obtain an
unfair advantage in the political marketplace.6 7 Compared to other
64. In re: Republican Governor's Association (N.C. State Bd. of
Elections Oct. 13, 2004) (unpublished agency order) (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review). See Sharif Durhams, Group Gets Record Fine for
Pro-BallantineAd, CHARLOTTrE OBSERVER, Sept. 10, 2004, at Al.
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.80(2) (2003).
66. While many of North Carolina statutes regulating campaign
contributions stem from the post-Watergate era, the prohibition against
corporate donations to political campaigns goes back to 1931. See N.C. GEN.
STAT.

§163-278.15 (2003).

67. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) ("This
concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth reflects
the conviction that it is important to protect the integrity of the marketplace of
political ideas."). See also Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 659-660 (1990) (recognizing a state's interest in protecting against "the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas"); FEC
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states, North Carolina laws provide among the clearest prohibition
against corporations, unions, and trade associations using funds
their treasuries to contribute to candidates or political
from S68
Nevertheless, politicians continue to find new ways to
parties.
solicit money from union and business treasuries, and corporations
As a consequence,
continue to find ways to contribute.
policymakers must remain vigilant and adapt state law to address
the new channels through which this money flows.
In 1998, the Republican House leadership in North Carolina
was accused by top hog producers of pressuring them for political
donations in return for favorable legislative treatment. While both
sides agreed they discussed fundraising and legislation at several
meetings, a direct link between money and policy was not
established in a special hearing held by the State Board of Elections
in May 1998.69 Revelations of those meetings provoked a stream of
v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm'n, 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982) (finding a
compelling government interest in ensuring that "substantial aggregations of
wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of
organization.., not be converted into political 'war chests' which could be
used to incur political debts from legislators").
68. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §163-278.19 (2003) ("[I]t shall be unlawful for
any corporation, business entity, labor union, [or] professional association...
directly or indirectly... [t~o make any contribution to a candidate or political
committee ... or to make any expenditure to support or oppose the
nomination of a ... candidate.") (emphasis added). See also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§163-278.15. (2003) ("No candidate, political committee, political party, or
treasurer shall accept any contribution made by any corporation, foreign or
domestic, regardless of whether such corporation does business in the State of
North Carolina.").
69. See Joe Neff, Legislators Tell of Clash on Hog Gifts, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 9, 1998, at Al; Wade Rawlins, Brubaker
Denies Linking Hog Rules to Gifts, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May
30, 1998, at Al; Wade Rawlins, Errant Witness Set Tone for Hog Hearing,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 28, 1998, at Al; Wade Rawlins,
Farmers Gave GOP Donations, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 27,
1998, at Al; Wade Rawlins, Hog Farmers' Charges Rejected, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 31, 1998, at Al; David Rice, Board Clears
Brubaker, Others in Fund-RaisingCase, WINSTON-SALEM J., May 31, 1998, at
Al; David Rice, Fund-RaisingAccusations Repeated, WINSTON-SALEM J., May
28, 1998, at Al. The incident was also the subject of editorial commentary, for
example: Politics Make for Vengeful Bedfellows, NEWS & RECORD
(Greensboro, N.C.), Apr. 9, 1998, at A10; Under the Big Top, NEWS &
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public comment on the apparent corrupting influence of political
contributions, even though a specific quid pro quo was never
proven. During the Board of Elections hearing, I furnished the
Board with information about more than $120,000 that the House
Republican leadership solicited from North Carolina companies
and hog industry executives, which was sent to "soft money"
accounts of the Republican National Committee (RNC).7 ° Some of
those donations did not show up on any federal disclosure reports,
and the timing of $118,667 sent by the RNC to a North Carolina
party account controlled by the Republican House leadership
raised the suspicion that the solicited corporate funds were being
laundered for use in North Carolina elections. At the hearing, the
chief executive of Klaussner Furniture confirmed that he had sent a
large contribution to the RNC from his corporation's bank account
at the request of Republican House Speaker Harold Brubaker (RRandolph County). 7' The Federal Election Commission later fined
two national Republican committees for using the Speaker's party
account as a conduit to route money to unregistered local
committees for electoral advocacy. 72
At the end of the hearing, the State Board of Elections
issued new regulations to ban the indirect flow of union and
corporate funds into North Carolina elections through national
political parties.73 In 1999, the General Assembly bolstered this
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 31, 1998, at A24.
70. Testimony by Bob Hall at N.C. State Board of Elections hearing on
May 31, 1998, based on a report by Hall entitled Extortion, Bribery, or
Business as Usual? (filed as an attachment to the hearing record, and available
at http://www.democracy-nc.org/moneyresearch/1998/extortionbribery.html)
(on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
71. See Robert Lamme, Elections Board Hears Testimony on GOP
Money, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), May 30, 1998, at Al.
72. Too-High Cost of Winning, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July

13, 1999, at A8 ("[The FEC] levied $12,000 in penalties against two
Republican finance committees that agreed to a spending subterfuge...
[involving House Speaker Harold] Brubaker and the Randolph County GOP
Executive Committee... In the FEC's analysis, the maneuver was deceitful
on more than one count.").
73. N.C. BD. OF ELECTIONS, RULING AND PROCEDURES PURSUANT TO
NCGS § 163-278.23 FOR NON-FEDERAL MONEY IN THE STATE OF NORTH
CAROLINA (June 15, 1998).
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regulation by outlawing contributions "made indirectly" by a
corporation or union to a national party account "with the intent or
purpose of being exchanged in whole or in part for any other funds74
to be contributed or expended in an election for North Carolina.,
The State Board of Elections used these provisions to prohibit the
national parties from sending "soft money" (the super-sized
donations that could not be used directly for federal candidates)
into North Carolina elections, unless the party could document that
the funds came from a bank account with no corporate or union
funds.
In early 2000, the national parties spotted the silver-lining in
the new regulations and began sending hundreds of thousands of
dollars in super-sized donations, supposedly all from individuals, to
the state parties and occasionally to a state candidate. Democracy
North Carolina maintained that the Board should have stopped all
soft money, because all the national party's bank accounts were
closely coordinated and funds in the corporate accounts made it
possible to send non-corporate money to states like North Carolina
(the sort of "exchange" "made indirectly" that the new law barred).
The Board did not agree, but in response to a complaint from
Democracy South in May 2000, it did begin enforcing a
requirement that the national money sent to North Carolina
originate from a segregated account, fully disclosed, with details
about the specific donations used.75 By the end of 2000, North
Carolina had joined many other states in receiving unprecedented
amounts of soft money - more than seven million dollars, including
$1.3 million sent directly to the Republican gubernatorial
candidate, Richard Vinroot.76
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.19(a)(1) (2004).
75. Democracy South, Complaint in the Matter of National 'Soft Money'
and State
Campaign Finance Issues, at
http://www.democracy-

nc.org/moneyresearch/2000/Soft%20Money/softmoneycomplaint.html

(Sept.

13, 2000).
76. Democracy South, National Soft Money In N.C. Tops $7 Million,
Gives Boost To Vinroot, Other Candidates, at http://www.democracync.org/moneyresearch/2000/Soft%20Money/softmoneytops$7M.html (Oct. 25,
2000). See Denise Barber, Life Before BCRA: Soft Money at the State Level,
2000
and 2002,
INST.
ON
MONEY
IN
STATE
POLITICS,
at
http://www.followthemoney.org/press/Reports/200312171.pdf (Dec. 17, 2003)
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The passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (BCRA), better known as the McCain-Feingold law, ended
the era of national parties collecting soft money."
But, as
predicted, other conduits of money from corporations, unions,
trade associations, and wealthy donors soon mushroomed; most
commonly "527 committees," named for the section of the Internal
78
Revenue Service code that grants them tax-exempt status. North
Carolina politicians quickly recognized the benefits and dangers of
these new vehicles, which in turn led to another round of regulation
aimed at keeping up with the changing world of campaign finance
practices. House Speaker Jim Black became finance chair of a
national 527 called the Democratic Legislative Campaign
Committee, which received over $200,000 from tobacco and
pharmaceutical companies within a few months of the businesses
successfully lobbying the State House for multi-million-dollar tax
breaks. 79 Art Pope, a former Republican legislator and patron of
the conservative John Locke Foundation, poured over $200,000 of
his company's money into a 527 committee that sponsored ads
The
attacking moderate Republicans in the 2004 primary.
Republican Party committee that had sent more than one million
dollars in soft money to help North Carolina's gubernatorial
candidate in 2000 transformed itself into a 527 committee,
independent of the Republican National Committee, and began
sponsoring ads for favored state candidates around the nation. ° As
(listing amounts state parties received in transfers of non-federal "soft money"
from the national parties as well as substantial funds received from other
sources).

77. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116
Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28
U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).

78. 26 U.S.C. § 527 (2004).
79. See Dan Kane, Firms Get Breaks, Dems Get Bucks,

NEWS

&

OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 23, 2004, at Al; Dan Kane, Tobacco
Company Officials Aid Morgan, Black, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
July 30, 2004, at B5.

80. See Amy Gardner, Debate Over 527 Ads Heats Up Governor's Race,
NEWS

&

OBSERVER

(Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 31, 2004, at B5; Eric Kelderman,

Govs' 527 Groups Gain Greenbacks, Influence, STATELINE.ORG, at
http://www.stateline.org/stateline/?pa=story&sa=showStorylnfo&id=404120
(Oct. 8, 2004).
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the 2004 election intensified, a bipartisan alliance of moderate
legislators in North Carolina rammed through a bill to block what
they feared might be an avalanche of 527-committee activity
financed with union or corporate money. 81 The new statute applies
provisions of BCRA to state elections and severely limits when an
"electioneering communication" can be made if it is paid by one of
these sources, even if it does not contain the traditional language of
82
express advocacy.
Once again, lawmakers properly focused
regulations on the financing of communications, not the content, an
approach that simultaneously protected the right to free speech and
the right to an election free of corrupting, super-sized donations
from the amassed wealth of businesses, unions and trade
associations.
IV. PUBLIC FINANCING ALTERNATIVES
In the 2002 election, more than half the money raised by
appellate judicial candidates in North Carolina came from
attorneys, many of whom practiced law in the candidates'
courtrooms, creating an awkward conflict of interest.83
For
example, of the $21,000 District Court Judge Fritz Mercer Jr. raised
by mid-April 2002 for his appellate court race, seventy-nine percent
came from forty three attorneys - forty two of whom practice in
Mecklenburg County, where Judge Mercer presides. Supreme
Court Justice Bob Orr raised $105,000 by the early spring and
seventy four percent came from attorneys, including dozens of
partners in the prestigious law firms that argue cases before the
Supreme Court. "Our system of electing judges is like letting major
league baseball players contribute money to influence the selection
of umpires to call their games," observed Judge James A. Wynn Jr.
at the time.84 As a member of North Carolina's court of appeals
and various national bar committees, Wynn became an early
81. Gardner, supra note 79; Kelderman, supra note 79.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§163-278.80 - 278.84 (2003).
83. Democracy N.C., Attorneys Supply 70% Of Campaign Money Raised
By Candidates For State's Top Court, at http://www.democracync.org/moneyresearch/2002/attyssupplymoney06l7O2.html (July 17, 2002).

84. Id.
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advocate for providing a public financing option in judicial elections
so candidates have an alternative way to finance their campaigns.
"I believe that people who know our judges know their
commitment to be fair and impartial outweighs any potential
influence that a political contribution may have," Wynn said.
"Unfortunately, the polls confirm that average citizens who do not
personally know their judges have a very hard time believing that
monetary contributions do not influence judicial decisions." 85
Members of the bar and bench also find the flow of money
from attorneys to judges troubling, yet efforts to move North
Carolina to a merit selection system have repeatedly failed. Finally,
in 2002, a broad coalition successfully promoted a four-part plan to
change the method of electing candidates to the state court of
appeals and supreme court. The plan would: (a) offer candidates a
competitive amount of public funds for campaigning if they
demonstrate a minimum level of public support and voluntarily
accept strict spending and fund-raising limits, (b) lower the limits
on private contribution, (c) make the elections nonpartisan, and (d)
provide a Judicial Voter Guide with information about the courts,
candidates, and voter registration. The public financing proposal
gained the bipartisan support of dozens of current and former
judges and hundreds of civic leaders and attorneys, including A.P.
Carlton of Raleigh, then president of the American Bar
Association. With crucial support from key legislators, a coalition
of grassroots activists and civic organizations called N.C. Voters for
Clean Elections coordinated the public education and lobbying
effort that pushed the Judicial Campaign Reform Act through the
State Senate in 2001 and then, by a narrow margin, through the
State House in 2002.86

85. Id.
Senator Wib Gulley (D86. N.C. GEN. STAT. §163-278.61 (2003).
Durham County) introduced Senate Bill 1054, the Judicial Campaign Reform
Act of 2001. On Nov. 20, 2001, the North Carolina Senate passed the bill by a
vote of 27 to 16. On Sept. 26, 2001, the North Carolina House modified and
passed the bill by a vote of 57 to 54. On Oct. 1, 2002, the Senate concurred
with those modifications by a vote of 36 to 12. Governor Michael Easley
signed the ratified bill into law in a ceremony in the old Capitol on Oct. 10,
2002. See Democracy N.C., N.C. Judicial Campaign Reform Passes State
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As an approach to campaign reform, public financing has
First, rather than mandate
several important advantages.
restrictions on potentially corrupting money from private donors,
public financing adds a new stream of "clean" money; it offers
"voter-owned" financing that replaces the need for hustling special
Second, rather than mandate
interest money altogether.
restrictions on the candidates' fundraising, the program offers
incentives to participate voluntarily; candidates get a reward if they
abide by various requirements. Both of these non-restraining
features undercut arguments that public financing stifles free
speech. Rather than rely on "command and control" regulations of
private money, the focus is on offering candidates a realistic
alternative with public funds. Private donors can still give to
candidates who choose to accept their funds; neither the donor nor
the candidate is forced to abandon core freedoms. Some programs,
including North Carolina's, provide additional matching or
''rescue" money when opposition spending exceeds the spending
limit a participating candidate has accepted, whether the excessive
spending comes from a non-participating candidate or from an
independent expenditure committee. As the First Circuit Court of
Appeals has noted, even this feature adds both money and speech
to the campaign, rather than mandating a cap on the private
spending that harms free speech rights.87
Public financing is also a remedial policy that helps address
the barrier referred to as "the wealth primary., 88 Research shows

Legislature,

at

http://www.democracy-

nc.org/nc/judicialcampaignreform/govsigns.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2005) (on
file with the First Amendment Law Review).
87. Daggett v. Webster, 74 F. Supp.2d 53 (D. Me. 1999), affid sub nom.
Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov'tal Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445 (1st
Cir. 2000) (upholding the matching funds trigger in Maine's Clean Election
Act and explicitly rejecting the reasoning in a Minnesota case, Day v.
Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1362 (8th Cir. 1994)). The First Circuit stated:
"Appellants misconstrue the meaning of the First Amendment's protection of
their speech. They have no right to speak free from response - the purpose of
the First Amendment is to 'secure the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources."' Id. at 464 (citing Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976)).
88. Jamie Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth
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that money has become the single most important predictor of
whether a candidate will win election to the North Carolina
Indeed, lack of wealth excludes many
General Assembly. 8
otherwise viable community leaders from competing for elected
office, much as skin color once blocked people from meaningful
political participation in the "white primary." Arguably, today's
exclusionary "wealth primary" imposes an unconstitutional
"property" requirement on potential officeholders; yet the
government sanctions the practice as part of the privately financed
North Carolina's
campaign-financing system it administers.
constitution contains especially strong language barring property
ownership as a prerequisite for a person's ability to run for office or
vote. 90 In 1999, a coalition composed of low-wealth candidates,
voters, and groups representing low-income citizens filed a
constitutional challenge to the "wealth primary." 91 Former North
Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice James G. Exum, Jr., and the
Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 273 (1993) (coining the term "wealth
primary"); Jamie Raskin & John Bonifaz The Constitutional Imperative and
PracticalSuperiority of DemocraticallyFinanced Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1160 (1994) (arguing for public financing as a remedy for the "wealth
primary").
89. Dr. Theodore S. Arrington, chair of the UNC-Charlotte Department
of Political Science, conducted an extensive analysis of General Assembly
candidate finances over four election cycles and concluded:
[I]n almost all situations, the amount of money that a
candidate spends is critical in determining what
proportion of the vote that candidate will receive and
therefore whether he or she will win... Expenditures

matter even when other factors such as incumbency are
controlled or taken into account.
Declaration of Theodore S. Arrington, Royal v. North Carolina, 153 N.C.
App. 495, 499, 570 S.E.2d 738, 741 (2002)) (No. 99 CV 13020) (unpublished
expert testimony prepared for plaintiffs) (on file with the First Amendment
Law Review).
90. "As political rights and privileges are not dependent upon or
modified by property, no property qualification shall affect the right to vote or
hold office." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 11.
91. See "They Know That Their Father Is a Fighter": Challenging the
Wealth Primary in North Carolina,NVRI UPDATE (Nat'l Voting Rights Inst.,
available
at
2000,
at
3,
Spring
Boston,
Mass.),
http://www.nvri.org/updates/S2000.pdf.
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Boston-based National Voting Rights Institute argued the case for
the plaintiffs, but the North Carolina Court of Appeals refused to
92
overturn a lower court's decision that the case lacked merit.
Nevertheless, many of the plaintiffs continue to believe the money
chase has become an unconstitutional restraint on their voting
rights. Importantly, like the "white primary," the wealth primary
imposes a special hardship on racial minorities. For example,
African-American candidates for the North Carolina General
Assembly raise, on average, only about forty percent as much as
their white counterparts; people of color make up only sixteen
percent of the state legislature compared to thirty percent of the
state's population. An exhaustive analysis of the two billion dollars
given in federal elections during 2000 and 2002, entitled The Color
of Money, concludes, "[I]n a political system in which you have to93
pay to play, people of color are largely excluded from the game.,
The Fannie Lou Hamer Project, one of the authors of the Color of
Money report, argues that winning public financing is the next
phase of the voting rights struggle.9 4 Whether as a means to correct
an unconstitutional system or to ensure meaningful participation by
a diversity of candidates, public financing offers a realistic chance

92. Royal v. North Carolina, 153 N.C. App. 495, 499, 570 S.E.2d 738, 741
(2002) (holding that the court could not order the state to provide public
financing for political campaigns because the issue was for the legislature).
93. Fannie Lou Hamer Project, The Color of Money: Campaign
Contributions, Race, Ethnicity, and Neighborhood 2003 Major Findings, at

http://www.colorofmoney.org/majorfindings_2003.htm (Dec. 2003). The report
quotes Hilary 0. Shelton, Director of the Washington Bureau of the NAACP:
As long as donors are more important than voters in
determining who gets elected in this country, then African
Americans are prevented from fully participating in

benefits of our democracy. Welcome to the new poll tax:
If you can't afford to contribute large sums to a politician,
then you [sic] voice and your interests are muted.
Id.
94. The Fannie Lou Hamer Project (named for the legendary freedom
fighter from Mississippi and co-founder of the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party) also developed the "Fannie Lou Hamer Standard" for
campaign finance reforms that help empower and protect the rights of lowincome people of color. See generally The Fannie Lou Hamer Project
(Kalamazoo, Mich.) at http:www.flhp.org (last visited Jan. 11, 2005).
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for success to leaders with a base in their community who lack
access to wealth. Without the public financing option, the right to
political free speech for those leaders and their supporters is a

hollow promise, effectively squelched.
Finally, public financing provides a way to change the
dynamics in the relationship between private contributor and public
servant. In a system wholly dependent on private money, the major
suppliers enjoy a distinct advantage. Politicians need their cash and
are placed in the unwholesome position of supplicants. The cash
suppliers become the "piper who calls the tune," more important
than the voters. Despite this distortion of democracy, major cash
suppliers predictably resist efforts to add new sources of financial
support that might weaken their advantage. In 2004, the North
Carolina Home Builders Association vigorously fought a bill in the
state legislature that authorized local governments to sponsor a
public financing program in their local elections. 95 The builders'
lobbyist told a legislative committee the bill would put his members
96
at an "unfair" disadvantage.
Importantly, the "sprawl lobby" of
95. See Local Campaign Finance Reform, S.B. 760, 2004 Gen. Assem.
(N.C.
2004)
(proposed),
available at
http://www.democracync.org/improving/S760page.pdf. Among the 2004 "legislative achievements"
that are posted on its website, the N.C. Home Builders Association takes
credit for "blocking several attempts to give local governments the authority
to establish publicly funded local campaign finance programs." See N.C.
Home
Builders
Ass'n,
Builderspage,
at
http://www.nchba.con/ann/art.asp?type=legislative %20news&text=Legislative
%20News&id=8933 (last visited Jan. 11, 2005) (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review). See also, Fiona Morgan, Home Builders Win the
Prize for Lobbying, INDEP. WKLY (Durham, N.C.), July 21, 2004 (reporting
that residential development regulations promulgated by elected officials
potentially affected by the Local Campaign Finance Reform bill, include
"impact fees, environmental protections, smart growth ordinances and so on[that] directly affect [members of the Home Builders Association's] profits").
96. Paul Wilms, Director of Government Affairs for the North Carolina
Home Builders Association, forcefully spoke against the bill that would
authorize local public financing at a July 2004 meeting of the House
Committee on Election Law and Campaign Finance Reform. See N.C. Home
Builders Ass'n, NCHBA Scores Major Victories in 2004 Legislative Session, at
http://www.nchba.com/ann/art.asp?type=legislative %20news&text=Legislative
%20News&id=8933 (last visited Jan. 11, 2005) [hereinafter HBA Legislative
Victories] (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
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builders, realtors, developers and contractors is the single largest
source of money in local elections, and it doesn't want

competition. 97 Giving a candidate freedom from dependency on
special-interest money is a terrifying thought to these interests. The
builders' lobbyist even said the local public financing bill would
impair his members' "First Amendment right to make
contributions" because their check would not be as indispensable if
the candidates had another source of money.9 8 The Home Builders
Association's website called the bill "unfair since it places local
governments in direct competition with individual contributors who
will continue to be subject to the $4,000 limit." 99 In other words,
the group prefers candidates with limited choices, not with the
freedom to choose how to finance their free speech.
The limited options a candidate has for financing a
campaign are especially problematic in statewide contests for the
agency heads in North Carolina's Council of State. Just as judicial
candidates attract little interest from donors beyond the legal
community, the would-be head of the insurance or agriculture
department, treasurer and superintendent of public instruction, etc.,
gain little attention from contributors beyond the businesses to
which the agency awards contracts or regulates.'0 0 The potential for

97. See Jay Price & David Raynor, Developers Build Reputation As Big
Campaign Donors, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 28, 2000, at Al
("Developers, builders and others whose paychecks depend on growth are by
far the biggest contributors to candidates for local office in the Triangle,
according to a News & Observer analysis of campaign-contribution records
from the past two years."); see also Jen Pilla, Many Donors Have Stake in
Growth, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 5, 2000, at B1 ("[I]t's clear that real
estate and development is the single sector giving the largest amount to the
candidates running for nine [Mecklenburg] county commissioner slots."). The
"Sprawl Lobby" is also the sector giving the largest amount in state-level
politics. See Democracy N.C., The N.C. Home Builders Association and the
Sprawl
Lobby
Donations,
at
http://www.democracync.org/moneyresearch/2003/SprawCCNCO3.pdf (Oct. 2003).
98. Paul Wilms, speaking at the N.C. House Committee on Election Law
& Campaign Finance Reform Hearing, July 2004. See supra note 96.
99. This quote is excerpted from the North Carolina Home Builders
Association's description of its opposition to Senate Bill 760 (Local Campaign
Finance Options). See HBA Legislative Victories, supra note 96.
100. An analysis of contributors to several members of the Council of
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corruption in that inherent conflict of interest played itself out in
2000 in the biggest political scandal in modern North Carolina
history. In the 2000 primary election for State Commissioner of
Agriculture, one of the candidates, Bobby McLamb, received an
illegal $75,000 loan from a New Jersey carnival company,
Amusements of America.' °1 Amusements of America was
interested in obtaining the contract to run the state fair, which the
agriculture commissioner awards.]
McLamb lost the primary to
Meg Scott Phipps, but he and the carnival company's North
Carolina agent, Norman Chambliss, immediately became active in
Phipps's general election campaign and helped her raise tens of
thousands of dollars in contributions from carnival-related business
owners.10 3 Phipps was finding it difficult to raise money for the
obscure agriculture post, even though her father and grandfather
served as North Carolina governors; her family eventually loaned
the campaign more than $500,000. '4 After her narrow victory,
Phipps placed McLamb and Chambliss in positions in her
administration where they guided the process for choosing the state
fair's chief operator; she ultimately awarded the contract to
Amusements of America.'0 5 Newspaper coverage of Phipps's large
loan repayments opened a can of worms that led to deeper
investigations by the State Board of Elections in 2002 and then by
the FBI and the U.S. Justice Department. 0 6 Phipps claimed
State reveals that they receive from 33 percent to 68 percent of their identified
campaign funds (excluding family money) from donors tied to the sectors they
award contracts to or regulate. See Democracy N.C., Fundraisingby Selected
Council of State Members in 2000 Election, at http://www.democracync.org/moneyresearch/2004/COS2000.pdf (May 24, 2000).
101. See Anna Griffin, Phipps Quits Post, Third Aide Indicted,
CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, June 7,2003, at Al.
102. Id.
103. See Joseph Neff, Phipps Aid Admits Guilt, Will Cooperatein Probe,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 13, 2003, at Al.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Anna Griffin, Trial Begins for Political Royalty, CHARLOTrE
OBSERVER, Oct. 20, 2003, at B1; Mark Johnson & Anna Griffin, FBI
Reportedly Investigating Ag Commissioner's Campaign, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, July 24, 2002, at Al; Bill Krueger & Joseph Neff, Phipps Finances
Probed,NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 9, 2002, at Al.
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ignorance of her campaign's finances and fundraising practices, but
a string of plea-bargains by McLamb, Chambliss and a half dozen
others revealed her involvement in receiving large, illegal cash
contributions in 2000 and 2001.1' Altogether, Democracy North
Carolina identified over $300,000 from carnival interests that went
to Phipps and her campaign. 1°8 Meg Scott Phipps was convicted on
federal and state charges and began serving a four-year prison term
in 2004.109
V. CONCLUSION

A robust public financing program would have given Phipps
the freedom to reject special-interest contributions. Instead, she is
the poster child for the corrupting power and bogus free speech
"benefits" of a campaign finance system that protects private
donors while limiting the choices of citizens and candidates. Once
again, North Carolina's experience teaches us the importance of
analyzing and addressing how rights in theory can become abuses in
practice. The First Amendment is not a tool for turning elections
into auctions, for maximizing the free flow of capital in politics
while squeezing out candidates and voters, or for privatizing the
process of choosing pubic officials. Rather it should enhance
vibrant, honest debate among diverse, competitive candidates who
engage citizens in the practice of self-government. Free and fair
elections must be strengthened, not subverted, in the name of
protecting free speech.

107. Anna Griffin, Phipps Penalized $130,000, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER,
June 8, 2002, at Al. See Sharif Durhams, Aide to Phipps Pleads Guilty in
Finance Case, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, May 13, 2003, at B1.
108. See Democracy N.C., Role of Norman Chambliss and Amusements
of America in Meg Scott Phipps Campaign-Finance Scandal, at
http://www.democracync.org/moneyresearch/2004/COS2000.pdf
(June 2004)

(summarizing federal indictments and findings of State Board of Elections in
the Phipps case).
109. Kristin Collins, Phipps Admits Illegal Fund Raising,
OBSERVER

NEWS

&

(Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 11, 2003, at Al; see Kristin Collins, No New

Jail Time for Phipps, NEWS &

OBSERVER

(Raleigh, N.C.), May 8,2004, at Bi.

